RIPE NCC Response to the Report
RIPE NCC Response to the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Digital Cooperation
September 2019
As an organisation that plays a key role in managing the infrastructure upon which the global Internet operates, and as a facilitator of Internet technical community coordination throughout Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia, the RIPE NCC is committed to a multistakeholder approach to Internet governance, ensuring that Internet governance decisions (including public policy decisions at all levels) are informed by the knowledge and concerns of all relevant stakeholders.
While the core functioning of the Internet is not directly referenced in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the continued development and health of the global Internet is key to many of the solutions and innovations that will help to fulfil the SDGs. In this light, there is an urgent need to identify approaches and structures that can ensure the effective participation of all stakeholders in global Internet governance.
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has provided a unique and valuable function for the past 13 years, bringing together a diverse range of Internet stakeholders, including the technical community, to share their perspectives and further discussions around all aspects of Internet governance. Over this period, it has offered the chance for people to learn about, examine and discuss a wide range of Internet governance issues, and through processes such as Dynamic Coalitions and Best Practice Forums, it has facilitated the production and publication of valuable background and analysis on issues including IPv6 adoption, cybersecurity, Internet exchange points and the Internet of Things.
However, the RIPE NCC recognises that both the technology and policy landscapes have changed considerably during that time and that, faced with a growing range of Internet governance challenges, many stakeholders (including some in the Internet technical community) are seeking global governance structures that can provide more in the way of concrete outcomes and the active participation of high-level policymakers and industry representatives. For all the value that we believe the IGF has generated, it is clear that the forum, as currently constituted, has not been able to meet the needs of all stakeholders.
We believe, however, that building on the successful aspects of a proven model offers the greatest chance of success moving forward. We therefore support the general concept of an “Internet Governance Forum Plus” model as outlined in the Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. Specifically, we support a next-generation model of digital governance that maintains the core values of inclusiveness, transparency and a multistakeholder approach.
We would encourage the Secretary-General to place a high emphasis on the valuable role played by national and regional Internet governance forums and events. These events provide important venues for discussion of region-specific issues, challenges and opportunities, and it is vital that we recognise that the Internet experience, and the associated challenges, vary hugely across different countries and communities. We also note that such regional structures have provided important venues for raising awareness of, discussing, and responding to the work of the panel. We urge the inclusion of a formal process for ensuring that the perspectives and strategies identified at the regional and national levels are transmitted into the global “IGF Plus” model outlined in the panel’s report.
We would also encourage the Secretary-General to prioritise securing concrete financial commitments from the full range of stakeholders as a fundamental aspect of implementing the “IGF Plus” model. The RIPE NCC is among those that have proudly and consistently contributed to the financial sustainability of the IGF since its inception; however, along with many others, we have noted the increasing difficulty in securing adequate funding and the adverse effect that this has had on successful IGF planning. A broad base of reliable financial support, drawing on contributions from all Internet stakeholders (inasmuch as they are able) and collected via the panel’s recommended IGF Trust Fund, is essential to secure the model’s sustainability for the foreseeable future.
Recent Comments on this Site
3rd July 2024 at 2:48 pm
The ideas discussed in this session were much broader. I propose to ionclude the following:
Citizens’ expectations from governments are increasing, and effective use of digital technologies can help meet these demands. Beyond technology development, it’s essential to cultivate digital skills and a forward-thinking mindset in the public sector. The main challenge is changing work habits and focusing on problem-solving before technology implementation. Digital services must be citizen-centric, secure, and user-friendly.
Open policy-making and innovative thinking are crucial, along with safe experimentation spaces like GovTech Labs. These labs test new policies and technologies, fostering innovation through skill development and co-creation. Design thinking and user experience should prioritize simplicity and functionality.
Success in digital services depends on organizational maturity and a clear vision supported by citizens and legislation. Challenges include digital skill gaps, data analysis capabilities, and regulatory barriers, requiring a shift towards enabling innovation.
Future challenges include digital identification, AI regulations, and ensuring technology accessibility for all, including senior citizens. Practical strategies and public co-creation are necessary for meaningful change.
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3rd July 2024 at 12:27 pm
Like David, I don’t think cybersecurity and ‘crypto-technologists’ should be considered non-technical.
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3rd July 2024 at 12:26 pm
I think Torsten’s suggestion for the last sentence of para.3 is a good one. Ross Anderson’s “chat control” paper made a convincing case that domestic violence and sexual abuse are closely linked, and that preventive measures which ignore one in favour of the other are less likely to be effective.
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3rd July 2024 at 12:14 pm
Thanks Torsten – I think the changes made result in a more balanced statement without sacrificing relevant detail. I remain concerned at the use of the word “exponential” without reference to substantiating evidence, for the reasons I set out in my previous comment.
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3rd July 2024 at 11:04 am
[Watermarking and certification of origin should be a more reliable means to authenticate content and should be supported by regulation.]
I would add here: Watermarking and certification of origin should be a more reliable means to authenticate content and should be supported by regulation, keeping in mind that also these methods can be circumvented.
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3rd July 2024 at 11:01 am
The session organizers and participants modified this message to better reflect the discussion at the workshop as follows:
The interplay of privacy and safety: The participants of Workshop 1a of EuroDIG believe privacy and child safety are intertwined and inseparable, advocating that legal solutions to combat child sexual abuse online must strive to optimise both. These measures should be centred on children’s rights and their best interests, as a way forward to achieve this balance.
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3rd July 2024 at 11:00 am
The session organizers and participants modified this message to better reflect the discussion at the workshop as follows: CSA is currently increasing exponentially and has serious consequences for the rights and development of children. For this reason, recognising such depictions and preventing child sexual abuse should go hand in hand. Participants are concerned about the safety of users, including with regard to the potential use of CSAM detection technology. Breaches of confidential communication or anonymity are seen critically. At the same time, advantages are recognised in the regulations, e.g. with regard to problem awareness or safety by design approaches. Age verification procedures are perceived as both a risk and an advantage, with a caution on risks to anonymity and participation.
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3rd July 2024 at 10:58 am
After a meeting among the workshop organizers, this message was changed as follows: Advancements in legal and regulatory measures on Child Sexual Abuse (CSA): Workshop 1a discussed three recent measures on the protection of children from online Child Sexual Abuse (CSA): the proposed EU CSA Regulation (CSAR), the new UK Online Safety Act, and the positive results from the Lithuanian Law on the Protection of Minors against detrimental effects of public information. An agreement was found on the need for better regulation in this field, emphasising the accountability of online service providers for monitoring illegal and harmful material and safeguarding minors.
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2nd July 2024 at 1:02 pm
From my perspective, the comments on technology take up too much space in this message. This topic was explored in more depth in another workshop. It also leaves too little room for other aspects that played a role in the exchange. Therefore, here is a suggestion to change the message:
CSA is currently increasing exponentially and has serious consequences for the rights and development of children. For this reason, recognising such depictions and preventing sexual violence should go hand in hand. Participants are concerned about the safety of users, including with regard to the potential use of technology. Breaches of confidential communication or anonymity are seen critically. At the same time, advantages are recognised in the regulations, e.g. with regard to problem awareness or safety by design approaches. Age verification procedures are perceived as both a risk and an advantage. It can improve the protection of children on the internet, limit the spread of CSA material and empower children. However, this should not be at the expense of anonymity and participation.
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1st July 2024 at 5:53 pm
New technology-open proposal for the first sentence of the paragraph, as there was no explicit request in the workshop to exclude CCS:
To detect CSAM online, only techniques that can protect privacy by not learning anything about the content of a message other than whether an image matches known illegal content should be used.
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